Abstract

Following Hegelian intuitions, many artists claim inalienable moral rights to their non-rivalrous creations based on a belief that, since the creations are solely an extension of the personality (will) of the individual creator, these works crystallize their unique intentions—and so, these creations are externalized manifestations of the creator. Concerns about others harming the creator through deformation of their creations follow from this. Citing worries regarding harm, some have argued that moral rights—such as the right of integrity—should extended to creators, even beyond their natural lives. I subdue such claims and adjoining positions about individual creation by synthesizing the kernels of Lockean, Hegelian, and folk perspectives. I argue that there is no sense to be made of harm coming to a creator through the “harm” of digital works, except in those instances where they are explicitly slandered. I conclude by appealing to Locke’s principle of Charity, claiming that able creators have an imperfect duty to contribute their work to the digital commons so that others might more successfully pursue their own creative projects. This article is the second of a pair; the first article is published in Volume 23, Issue 1 of Information, Medium & Society; Journal of Publishing Studies.