Abstract
The paper compares Berkeley’s positions regarding laws of nature in his Principles of Human Knowledge (henceforth Principles) 106-107 and De Motu (henceforth DM). The comparison shows that: (1) In Principles 106 the notion of universal laws of nature is rejected. In its stead Berkeley introduces the notion of “general laws” which hold sway only in a certain part of the universe. Contrarily, in DM the universality of laws of nature is accepted. (2) Whereas Principles 106 (and 108) warns that the psychological motive that drives us to seek for generalisations may lead scientific inquiries to errors, DM regards this motive positively as one which leads the scientific inquiry in the right direction (3) According to Principles 107 the constancy of laws of nature cannot be taken for granted. However, in DM laws of nature are described as “constant,” and no question is raised regarding this issue. (4) In Principles 106 and 107 it is straightforwardly argued that laws of nature are not necessary whereas in DM this issue is ambiguous and not as clear. (5) There are similarities in Berkeley’s position in the two sources. In Both Principles and DM Berkeley argues that laws of nature reveal connections between phenomena but underlines that laws of nature do not uncover any inherent qualities of bodies, such as power or force, and do not unveil “real causes” (according to Berkeley only minds can be causes in the true sense of the words).
Presenters
Adam Weiler Gur AryeLecturer, Education and Multi-disciplinary Studies, Tel Hai College, Israel
Details
Presentation Type
Paper Presentation in a Themed Session
Theme
KEYWORDS
Berkeley, Principles of Human Knowledge, De Motu, Laws of Nature
